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Abstract 
Positive political economy is usually concerned with economic explanations of observed 
policy choices, while the timing of a policy reform has not gained similar attention.  This is 
somewhat surprising since policy makers most often are free to decide both the design and 
timing of a policy reform.  Drawing on insights from recent developments in the finance 
literature on investment under uncertainty, here we apply the idea of option value to the 
analysis of government policy making.   
Common political-economic explanations of the 1992 CAP reform are that policy-
makers felt domestic political pressure to make the CAP more efficient, and also international 
political pressure and to bring the CAP in line with treaty obligations.  Although these 
arguments are sound, they fail to explain why policy-makers did not enact the reform earlier, 
especially during times of decreasing world market prices prior to 1992.  We address this 
question using the theory of option value, which is the value of being able to wait in decision-
making.  Commonly governments are free to decide when to reform policy.  Waiting to 
reform policy can improve government decisions.   For while waiting decision-makers may 
observe market parameter changes as they occur.   (For example, they may obtain better 
information about changes in world prices.)  This reduces their uncertainty about the effects 
of their decisions.  Giving up the option to wait incurs a cost which has to be taken into 
account in policy decisions.  We illustrate the option value concept using a political-economy 
model of the 1992 CAP reform.  We show empirically that if decision-makers had not had the 
option to wait to reform policy, it would have been more efficient to implement the 1992 CAP 
reform in the mid 1980s.     3 
The Economics of Delaying Policy Change: 
An Application to the 1992 CAP Reform 
 
Positive political economy is usually concerned with economic explanations of observed 
policy choices, while the timing of a policy reform has not gained similar attention.  This is 
somewhat surprising since policy makers most often are free to decide both the design and 
timing of a policy reform.  Drawing on insights from developments in the finance literature on 
investment under uncertainty, here we apply the idea of option value to the analysis of 
government policy making.   
Our main argument is that, under certain conditions, when information is revealed 
over time there is a value to having the option to wait, and this value should be taken into 
account in policy analysis.  Irreversibility of the policy reform in question, uncertainty about 
future variables, and the existence of sunk costs are prerequisites for the ability to wait to be 
valuable.   That is, there is no value of waiting to make a decision if a policy reform can be 
reversed at no cost.   Nor is there value in waiting if there is no uncertainty about the future, 
since option value can exist only if information is to be revealed during the waiting period.   
A basic result of the application of the theory is that is may be worthwhile for government to 
postpone reforms to wait for better information.   
Our main theoretical contribution the positive political economy literature comes from 
relaxing the assumption that the policy-making process occurs at a single point in time under 
perfect information.   Instead, we model policy made under imperfect information over time, 
with better information revealed as time proceeds.    
We apply option value theory to study the timing of European Union (EU) agricultural 
policy-making.   Like most agricultural policies in the Western Hemisphere, the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) involves a high degree of government intervention.  But 
this degree is not constant; since the early 1990s, the EU has reformed the CAP significantly.     4 
We ask why the reforms were passed when they were passed.   For long before the 1992 CAP 
reform a whole range of policy change proposals had been put forth, all touting the potential 
benefits of making changes much like those changes finally made in 1992.   Our explanation 
of the timing of EU policy change relies on the relative irreversibility of the reforms (i.e., that 
once a reform was made, it was quite costly to reverse it).   This irreversibility was especially 
noticeable after the 1992 CAP reform, which introduced direct payments as compensation for 
reduced price supports.  Sunk costs of policy making arise in various ways.   There are the 
pure costs of deciding on policies, i.e.  the costs of legislators’ salaries, the cost of their travel, 
and of heating the legislature’s building, etc.   In addition, sunk costs of agricultural policy 
reform arise because agricultural investments are often quite sector-specific, having only poor 
alternative uses once they have been made.   
 
CAP Reforms in the 1990s  
The origin of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union dates back to 1957 
when six member states signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community.  Ever since, agriculture has been an integral part of the common policies of the 
EU.  The degree of EU intervention through agricultural policies evolved gradually.  At the 
beginning commodity-specific organizations secured policies with market prices and market 
intervention rules being common across countries.  EU market prices were significantly 
higher than world market prices and led to considerably increased production.  By the 1980s, 
keeping EU prices at their target levels raised budget costs enough to lead decision makers to 
intervene in agricultural markets with (quasi) production-limiting instruments.  Examples 
were milk quotas (introduced in 1984) and so-called “stabilisers” for cereals markets that 
automatically cut next-period prices if production in the current period exceeded pre-specified 
levels.  In February 1991, the EU Commission released a report on the development and   5 
future of the CAP, initiating a discussion that led ultimately to the adoption of the MacSharry 
reforms of May 1992.   
Trade negotiations within the GATT Uruguay Round led to a second and parallel 
strand of pressure for CAP reform.    These negotiations covered three areas of agricultural 
policy: market access, domestic support, and export subsidies.  The trade talks began in 1986, 
and in December 1991 a first draft Final Act was released and acknowledged by Arthur 
Dunkel, Director-General of GATT.  Persistent differences between the EU and the US on 
agricultural policy reform stalled the negotiations, but significant progress was made with the 
Blair House Accord in November 1992, just six months after the adoption of the 1992 CAP 
reform.  The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was then finalized in December 
1993, establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995.   
 
Theoretical Discussion 
Our theory of policy timing relies heavily on the concepts of option value and negotiation 
costs.   When decisions are made under uncertainty, and when better information arrives over 
time, then having the ability to wait before making a decision has a value, called the option 
value (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  For decisions to be made in the political arena, most nations 
have in place institutions that facilitate the meeting and bargaining of varying interest groups 
or their representatives.  There are obvious costs to such meetings and the bargaining that 
takes place in them.  In one sense, the whole political process of debating issues, lobbying, 
voters keeping themselves informed, etc., is costly.  We maintain that this costliness of 
meeting and bargaining affects how often Parliaments meet, how often elections are held, and 
how often major pieces of agricultural policy legislation are passed.  It is this cost which 
keeps governments from finely tuning policies on a day-by-day or even minute-by-minute   6 
basis.  In the EU and many separate nations, typical major agricultural policy legislation is 
passed only once every handful of years. 
 
A Simple Supply and Demand Model of the EU’s Intervention Price 
For purposes of illustration, we present a very simple model of the European Union wheat 
market.   We assume throughout that prices in all other markets are constant, and that in the 
absence of government intervention in the wheat market the country is a price-taking importer 




* ( ) to be a market equilibrium in 
year t:  
(1)  qdt
* = D pdt
* ( ), 
(2)  qst
* = S pst
* ( ), 
where the notation is standard:  the asterisks denote an equilibrium value of a variable, the t 
index denotes year or period, the s index stands for “supply,” and the d index denotes 
demand.  We illustrate the supply and demand functions in the usual way in figure 1. 
We assume that the EU government has one independent policy instrument available 
to it to intervene in the EU’s wheat market in any year t:  the intervention price policy 
instrument, called at.  This instrument is the EU government’s binding pledge to pay price at 
to any EU wheat producer who wants to sell a unit of wheat at that price in year t.  Domestic 
suppliers refuse to sell to domestic consumers for less than the intervention price because they 
can always obtain the intervention price by forfeiting their crop to the government.  Therefore 
when the intervention price is set above the world price, that intervention price becomes the 
price that domestic suppliers receive and domestic consumers pay in equilibrium: 
(3)  pdt
* = at, 
(4)  pst
* = at.   7 
We let βt represent the world price of wheat in year t.  In order to maintain the 
intervention price as the domestic supply and demand price, the government must prevent 
international arbitrage, which it does by placing a per-unit export subsidy (or import tariff if 
negative), denoted λt
∗, equal to at – βt, on any unit of wheat import from or exported to 
another nation:
1   
(5)  λt
∗ = at – βt. 
Equations (1) – (5) implicitly define a vector of five equilibrium functions, 
qdt
* at,βt ( ),qst
* at,βt ( ), pst
* at,βt ( ), pdt
* at,βt ( ),λt
* at,βt ( ) ( ), all dependent on the intervention 














Figure 1.  Equilibrium when the intervention price is set above the price and which domestic 
supply and demand intersect 
 
Meeting and Negotiation Costs 
We assume that policy change is costly for government.  We imagine that to change a policy, 
government must hold some type of meeting at which various political interests conduct 
negotiations.  Such a meeting has a fixed cost (the travel time of negotiators, etc.), denoted f.  
We assume that greater changes in policy are more costly to implement than are smaller 
changes.  (Perhaps the debate takes longer, so the opportunity costs of the time spent at the 
meeting rise.)  The negotiation cost function is, 






















   9 
where mt = 1 when a meeting is held and mt = 0 when a meeting is not held.  The parameter γ 
> 0 determines how costs escalate with the size of the (square of the) policy change.  The 
parameter ξ  > 0 is assumed to be very large, and has the effect of making it prohibitively 
costly to change policy if no meeting is held.  
 
Interest Group Welfare 
We assume two mutually exclusive interest groups.  The group indexed by c is made up of 
EU consumers and taxpayers.  The group indexed by s is comprised of EU wheat suppliers.  
We assume that negotiation costs are paid by the interest groups according to their shares of 
the population, δc and δs.  To measure the supplier group’s welfare in yeart, we use an 
exogenous level of welfare us
0, plus “producer surplus,” minus payments to cover the 
suppliers’ share of government’s negotiation costs: 
(7)  us at,mt,at−1 ( ) = us
0 + S z ( )dz
0
at
∫ −δsc at,mt,at−1 ( ). 
There are two periods in our model.  Total producer welfare is the discounted sum of the first 
and second years’ producer welfare levels: 




∑ us at,mt,at−1 ( ), 
where x = (a1, x1, a2, m2) is the vector of the government’s choice variables, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is 
a discount factor. 
We measure consumer-taxpayer welfare as an exogenous level u1
0 plus consumer 
surplus, minus the taxes necessary to finance the export subsidy (or, if domestic demand 
exceeds supply at the intervention price, these are tariff revenues added, not subtracted), 
minus payments to cover the consumer-taxpayers’ share of government’s negotiation costs:   10 
(9)  uc at,mt,at−1,βt ( ) = uc
0 + D z ( )
at
∞
∫ dz − at − βt ( ) S at ( )− D at ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦−δcc at,mt,at−1 ( ). 
Total consumer-taxpayer welfare is the discounted sum of their first and second-year welfare: 
(10)  Uc x,ω ( ) = ρ




where ω  = (β1, β2) represents the ordered pair of the world prices. 
The parts of the welfare measures uc at,mt,at−1,βt ( )and us at,mt,at−1 ( ) not involving 
negotiation costs are illustrated in figure 1, assuming a particular policy  ′ at  and a particular 
world price βt
0.  Without payments for negotiation costs, the welfare level of wheat producers 
in year t is some number us
0 plus the sum of areas B, C, D, and G.  The welfare level of 
consumers-taxpayers is some number uc
0 plus area A, minus the sum of areas C, D, E, and F. 
 
Government’s Ex Post Payoff Function 
We will employ a very simple model of political economy, in which government’s objective 








∑ αcuc at,mt,at−1,βt ( )+αsus at,mt,at−1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
= αcuc a1,m1,a0,β1 ( )+αsus a1,m1,a0 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ζ1 x1,β1 ( )
     
+ ρ αcuc a2,m2,a1,β2 ( )+αsus a2,m2,a1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ζ2 x1,x2 ,β2 ( )
     
.
 
As shown in (11), ζ1(x1, β1) is the utility derived by government in year 1 when it makes 
decision x1 = (a1, m1), given the world price β1, and ζ2(x1, x2, β2) is the utility derived by 
government in year 2 when it makes decision x2 = (a2, m2), given the world price β2, and 
given its past decision x1 = (a1, m1).   11 
Policy Timing 
To focus on some essential aspects of information and policy timing, our model political 
economy operates for two years.
2  We illustrate our policy-timing story in figure 2.  At the 
start of period 1 (“May 1”) everyone is assumed to know that level of the previous year’s 
world price.  With this information, politicians meet and negotiate in period 1, when they 
must set period 1’s intervention price level.  They may also decide to set period 2’s 
intervention price at this time, thus eliminating negotiations in period 2.  Or, they may decide 
to put off setting period 2’s intervention price until they meet again in period 2.   If they 
decide to set both years’ policy levels in year 1, then they do so only with information about 
the level that the world price random variable took on in the previous year (on “October 1”).  
If, however, they delay setting year 2’s policy, then when year 2 comes around they have 
more information, having observed the value that the world price took on in period 1 after 
their meeting in that period.  Having knowledge of the level of the preceding year’s world 
price provides useful information because the world price follows a random walk. 
 
The Random Walk of the World Price 
As illustrated in figure 3, we bring uncertainty into the model by assuming that the world 
price follows a random walk, and is known to have taken on the value β
0 in the year 
preceding year 1.  The world price in year 1 can take on two values:  a value β
D lower than β
0, 
or a value β
U higher than β
0.  Relative to year 1’s world price, the world price in year 2 can 
either change by some positive amount ∆H or by some negative amount ∆L.  Therefore in 
period 2 one of four possible world prices occurs: β
D + ∆L, β
D + ∆H, β
U + ∆L, or β
U + ∆H.  
We define a generic state of nature as ω = (β1, β2), an ordered pair of the first and second 
periods’ world prices.  There are therefore four possible states of nature in our model:  the 
world price can fall in both years, leading to the state of nature ω
DL = (β
D, β
D + ∆L), it can fall   12 
then rise, leading to ω
DH = (β
D, β
D + ∆H), it can rise then fall, leading to ω
UL = (β
U, β
U + ∆L), 
or it can rise in both years, leading to ω
UH = (β
U, β






3  We assume that the price goes down in year one with probability π
D, 
goes up in year 1 with probability π
U = 1 – π
D, becomes lower in year 2 with probability π
L, 
and becomes higher in year 2 with probability π
H = 1 – π
L.  Assuming that price movements 
(not the price levels, which follow a random walk) in each year are independent, then the four 













We will find it convenient at times also to use the notation π
ij = π(ω
ij) for i = D, U and j = L, 





Figure 2.  Scenarios of policy timing
Meet, then choose 
a1 and a2 freely, 
or don’t meet and 
then choose a1 = 
a0.  










Meet, then freely 
revise the choice a2, 
or don’t meet and 
then choose a2 = a1. 


















β, world price 
Figure 3.   Random walk of world price 
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Information Structures 
The value of information plays a crucial part in our theory of policy timing.  In this section we 
follow Laffont (1990) to define formally what we mean by the “value of information.”   
 
Definition of an Information Structure without Noise 




UH}.  We use θ to 
denote the sigma algebra of Ω, which because Ω has a finite number of elements is the set of 
subsets of Ω (Laffont 1990, p.  6).  The space of states of nature is the set containing all the 




Ω,θ ( ) = ω
DL { }






S3   
, ω
UH { }































































The number of ways that a set with n elements can be partitioned is called the n
th Bell 
number (Wolfram Math World 2009).  The fourth Bell number is 15, and this is the number of 
partitions of the set of states of nature in our example.
5  These partitions are displayed in table 
1. 
   15 
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DH,ω
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DH,ω





UL { }, ω
DL { }, ω
UH { } { }   
 
Each of the partitions of Ω is associated with a separate information structure without noise.  
For example, if the government has information structure I
13, which is the information 





UH { }, ω
DL { }, ω
UL { } { }, it is as 
if there is an “expert” who knows the true state of nature, and makes the following offer to the 
government:  “If you pay me some money, if the true state of nature is ω
DL, I will tell you.  If 
it is ω
UL, I will tell you.  And if it is in the set {ω
DH, ω
UH} I will tell you that it is in that set, 
but I will not tell which element of that set it is.”   
More formally, let I
1, … , I
15 denote the information structures without noise in our 
example.   For j = 1, .  .  .  , 15, I
j consists of a space of signals Y
j and a function φ
j  from the 
space of states of nature (Ω, θ) to Y
j.  The function φ





UH { }, ω
DL,ω
DH,ω
UL { } { }.  Let us define a function φ
5:  
(13)  φ
5 S ( ) =
y1
5 if S =  ω
UH { }
y2














5 = {S ∈ (Ω, θ):  φ





5 { } and O
5(y) be 
the inverse of function φ




5 y ( ): y ∈Y
5 { }.  The other fourteen functions φ
j 
and spaces Y
j are defined similarly and then used to define the other fourteen partitions as P
j =   16 
{S ∈ (Ω, θ): φ
j S ( ) is defined} = 
￿ 
O
j y ( ): y ∈Y
j { }.  The fifteen information structures without 
noise are then I
j = (Y
j, φ
j ), j = 1, … 15.
6  
 
The Value of an Information Structure 
We assume that the government maximizes expected utility given the information structure it 
faces.  When facing P
j, the government believes that it will receive signal y with probability,  
(14)  Pr y P
j ( ) =
0 if ω ∉O
j y ( )
π ω ( )dω
O









Using Bayes’s theorem, it believes that if it receives signal y then the probability of the true 
state being ω is
7 
(15)  v ω y ( ) =
0 if ω ∉O
j y ( )
π ω ( )
π z ( )dz
O
















a2 ,m2 ( )∈X2









where Xt is the set of feasible decisions (at, mt) in period t = 1, 2.  Let the solution to this 
problem be denoted x
*(y) =  a1
* y ( ),m1
* y ( ),a2
* y ( ),m2
* y ( ) ( ).  Then the value (the expected 
utility) of receiving signal y is V(y): 
(17)  V y ( ) = ψ x
* y ( ),ω ( )v ω y ( )dω
Ω ∫ .   17 
Equations (14) – (17) imply that the government can make an ex ante evaluation of the 
expected utility from facing partition P
j as,  
(18) 
W P





* y ( ),ω ( )
Ω ∫ ⋅v ω y ( )⋅Pr y P




* y ( ),ω ( )
O
j y ( ) ∫ ⋅v ω y ( )⋅Pr y P




* y ( ),ω ( )
O
j y ( ) ∫ ⋅
π ω ( )
π z ( )dz
O
j y ( ) ∫
⋅ π z ( )dz
O

















* y ( ),ω ( )
O




If there are a finite number of states of nature, then equation (18) reduces to 
(19)  W P
j; π . ( ),ψ . ( ) ( ) = ψ x
* y ( ),ω ( )π ω ( )
ω∈O
j y ( ) ∑
y∈Y
j ∑ , 




5; π . ( ),ψ . ( ) ( ) = ψ x
* y ( ),ω ( )π ω ( )
ω∈O











DL ( )π ω
DL ( )+ψ x
* y2
5 ( ),ω
DH ( )π ω
DH ( )+ψ x
* y2
5 ( ),ω
UL ( )π ω
UL ( ).
 
The Fineness of Information Structures 
We say that an information structure I
m is finer than an information structure I
n if the partition 
P
m associated with I
m is finer than the partition P
n associated with I
n.
8  Laffont (1990, p.  59) 
proves that given any prior distribution π(.) and any utility function ψ(.), that the expected 
value of facing the finer information structure I
n is at least as great as the expected value of 
facing I
m:  
(21)  W P
n; π . ( ),ψ . ( ) ( ) ≥W P
m; π . ( ),ψ . ( ) ( ).     18 
Applying the Information Structure Framework to Our Model 
To more easily compare the expected utility of the government who must choose x1 = (a1, m1), 
and x2 = (a2, m2) in period 1 to the government who chooses x1 and period 1 and x2 in period 
2, consider a third government who also must choose x1 in period 1 and x2 in period 2, but has 
no memory.  This government’s choices and ex ante expected utility will be the same as the 
government who must choose both x1 and x2 in period 1.  This third government would face 
partition P
1 in the first period, and it would make a binding choice for x1 and a “provisional” 




ζ1 x1,ω ( )+ ρζ2 x1,x2,ω ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
Letting the solution to this problem be called  x1
**, ˆ x2 ( ), only the decision x1
** would actually 
“count,” since the third government could choose a different value for x2 in the second period.  
Once arrived at period 2, since this government has no memory of its previous choices or the 
world price that was revealed in period 1, again it faces partition P
1 (that is, all it knows is that 




UH}).  Therefore in the second period it again 
solves the problem in (22).  Call the decisions it makes in the second period  ˆ x1,x2
** ( ), where 
the choice  ˆ x1 is the choice the government would make if it could actually choose x1 again, 
and x2
** is the actual decision that “counts.”  Note that the government that has to make both 
decisions in period 1 also faces partition P
1, and also solves (22).  Call this government’s 
choices  x1
*,x2
* ( ).  Because  x1
*,x2
* ( ),  x1
**, ˆ x2 ( ), and  ˆ x1,x2
** ( ) all solve (22), then assuming that 
the solution to (22) is unique, it must be that  x1
*,x2
* ( ) =  ˆ x1,x2
** ( ) =  x1
**, ˆ x2 ( ).  Clearly also, 
x1
*,x2
* ( ) =  x1
**,x2
** ( ).  The utility expected by the government who must make both decisions 
in period 1 is  
   19 
(23)  W
* = ζ1 x1
*,ω ( )+ ρζ2 x1
*,x2
*,ω ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
We can break this welfare amount up into the amount experienced in period 1 and the 
absolute value of the amount experienced in period 2: 
(24)  W1
* = ζ1 x1
*,ω ( )
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ); 
(25)  W2




1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
The utility expected to be derived in period 1 by the government who chooses x1 in period 1 
and x2 in period 2 but has no memory, and therefore chooses x1 facing partition P
1 and then 
chooses x2 also facing partition P
1 is 
(26)  W1
** = ζ1 x1
**,ω ( )
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
The present value of the expected utility derived in the second period by the government 
without memory is 
(27)  W2




1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 





** = ζ1 x1
**,ω ( )
ω∈O




1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( )
= ζ1 x1
**,ω ( )+ ρζ2 x1
**,x2
**,ω ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ).
Comparing (23) and (28), since  x1
*,x2
* ( ) =  x1
**,x2
** ( ), it must be that W
* = W
**.  That is, the 
expected utility of a government who must make both of its choices in period 1 is equal to the 
expected utility of a government who must choose x1 in period 1 and then choose x2 in period 
2 with no memory—that is, of the government who faces P
1 when choosing x1 and P
1 again 
when choosing x2.     20 
In contrast, if the government decides on x1 in period 1 and then on x2 in period 2 with 
full knowledge of the value of β1 that appeared in the first period, then it bases its decision on 
x1 on partition P
1.   Call its choice x1
***.  Since it made this choice while facing the same 
partition, P
1, as did the other two governments, its first-year choices will be the same as theirs, 
so x1
***  = x1
** =  x1
*.   Therefore its expected utility derived in the first period will be   
(29)  W1
*** = ζ1 x1
***,ω ( )
ω∈O
1 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
Since x1
***  = x1
** = x1
*, then (24), (26), and (29) imply that the amount of utility derived in the 




Now say that before period 1 a government was trying to calculate how much it is 
worth, ex ante, to have the right to decide on x2 in period 2.  (That is, it is trying to calculate 
how much it would be willing to pay, before the world price in period 1 is revealed, to have 
the right to decide on x2 after the world price in period 1 is revealed.)  With the right, the ex 
ante value of the government’s upcoming utility gained in period 1 is W1
*** show in (29), and 





***,x2,ω ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ω∈O
6 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
Since x1
***  = x1





*,x2,ω ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
ω∈O
6 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ). 
But the government that makes its choices in separate periods expects to obtain to W2
** of 
equation (27) in period 2.  Finally, since x1
* = x1
**, we can substitute x1
*
 for x1
** in equation 
(27) and conclude, 
(32)  W2




6 y ( ) ∑ π ω ( ).   21 




Finally, since we have already shown that W1
* = W1
** = W1






Equation (34) mean that the welfare expected by the government when it can wait to choose 
x2 until after the value of the first period’s random world has been revealed is at least as great 
as the welfare expected when it must make all its decisions before period 1 begins.
9  The 
difference in these two welfare levels is the value of having the option to wait until after the 
world price is revealed to make the x2 decision is called an option value: 
(35)  OV = W1
*** +W2
*** ( )− W1
** +W2
** ( ) ≥ 0. 
The Trade-off between Obtaining Good Information and Setting Policies as Immediate 
Circumstances Dictate 
The concepts of option value and negotiation costs are key to our theory of policy timing.  If 
changing policies were not costly and information were complete, then it would make sense 
for governments to change policies very frequently as it views changes in the economic 
and/or political climate.  But real governments face a trade-off.  If they meet and change a 
policy today, then it will be costly to meet again and change that policy some time in the 
future.  But since more information is available over time, it might make sense for a 
government to wait before holding a meeting to change policy.  Two questions arise:  How 
often should a government hold meetings?;  and what policy changes should it make at such 
meetings? 
 
A Simulation Conducted with Our Model of Political Economy 
  Data and Parameters 
The baseline data for our model are shown in table 1.    22 
 
Table 1.  Basiline data and elasticities 
Intervention price of 
wheat, 1991, in year-
2000 euros per ton 
169.68   Source:  FAOSTAT.  Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. http://faostat.fao.org. 
Production, 1990/1991, 
million metric tons of 
wheat and course grains 
89.1  Source:  
www.fas.usda.gov/grain/circular/2000/00-
07/hist_tbl.pdf 
Dometic total use, 
1990/1991, million 
metric tons 
65.1  Source:  
www.fas.usda.gov/grain/circular/2000/00-
07/hist_tbl.pdf 
Own-price elasticity of 
supply of wheat 
0.50  Sullivan, et al. (1989) 
Own-price elasticity of 
supply of wheat 
-0.27  Sullivan, et al. (1989) 
 
set the parameters of the model at the following levels: 
a0 = 169.68 (year 2000 Euros per ton, ), c0 = 82.677 (million tons); c1—0.103589 (million 
tons per euro); b0 = 44.55 (million tons); b1 = 0.262553 (million tons per euro); δc = 0.90; δs = 
0.10; ξ = 100,000000 (million Euros per euro of change in the intervention price); uc
0  = 
10,000,000 (million Euros); us
0 = 10,000,000; γ = 10; ρ = 0.95, αc = 0.25; as = 0.75, π
D = 0.4, 
π
U = 0.6, π
L = 0.7,  = 0.7, π
H  = 0.3, and we let the parameter representing the fixed costs of 
holding a negotiation, f, vary.  We let the initial value of the world price be b0 = 100.  First-
period values are β1
D = 90 and β1
U  = 106.   From the first period to the second period, the   23 
world price can change by ∆L = -5 or by ∆H = 13.  The supply and demand parameters reflect 
the SWOPSIM elasticities (Sullivan, et al. 1989) of 0.5 and -0.27.  For the purposes of the 
simulation, other parameter values were chosen largely arbitrarily.  
 
  Political Power Weights 
We obtain estimates of our model’s “political power weights,” ac and as by assuming that 
(x1, x2, m1, m2) = (169.68, 169.68, 1, 1) was the solution to the maximization problem 
implied  by (11) and (23), for year 1 being 1990 and year 2 being 1991.  (That is, we are 
assuming that the actual intervention price set by the EU in 1991 was set in both years, and 
that negotiations were held in both years, and that the result was to maximize the 
government’s objective function in (11).
10)  Combining (11) and (23), the government’s 
problem of maximizaing its expected utility, Eψ(a1, a2, m1, m2) can be written as, 
 




m1∈ 0,1 { }
m2 ∈ 0,1 { }
π
ij αc uc a1,m1,a0,β1
i ( )+ ρuc a2,m2,a1,β2
ij ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦+αs us a1,m1,a0 ( )+ ρus a2,m2,a1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ ( )
j∈ L,H { } ∑
i∈ D,U { } ∑ .
 
Using the parameter values discussed above, we substituted the observed values a1
ob  = 
169.68, a2
ob  = 169.68, m1
ob  = 1, and m1
ob  = 1 into the first-order conditions of (36) to obtain, 
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(37) 






















⎥ j∈ L,H { } ∑




















⎥ j∈ L,H { } ∑
i∈ D,U { } ∑ ≡ 0






















⎥ j∈ L,H { } ∑















⎥ j∈ L,H { } ∑
i∈ D,U { } ∑ ≡ 0.
 
The equations in (37), together with ac + aS = 1, form an over-derermined system of three 
equations with two unknowns which has no solution.  This difficulty is typical, and is usually 
overcome in PPF studies by assuming a model of political economy in which the number of 
interest groups is exactly one more than the number of policy instruments (Bullock 1994).  
For the purposes of the simulation, we ignore this difficulty, and instead solve the first 
equation in (37) along with ac + aS = 1 to obtain ac = 0.340574 and as = 0.659426.  Then we  
solve the second equatio in (37) along with ac + aS = 1 to obtain ac = 0.340169 and as = 
0.659831.  Because theses results are very similar, we simply take their means to obtain ac = 
0.340371 and as = 0.659629 for use in the rest of the simulation. 
 
The Effects of Higher Fixed Costs of Negotiation on the Frequency of Meetings 
The effects of higher fixed costs of negotiation on the frequency of meetings and on each 
period’s intervention price are summarized in Table 3,  and also in figure 4. 
   25 
 
 
Table 3.  Relationship between the fixed costs of negotiation the frequency of negotiations, 
and the intervention prices set in each period  
f 
fixed costs of 
negotitation 




















f < 23.3  Yes  Yes  166.712  165.233   
23.3 < f < 106.1  Yes  No  166.625  166.625   
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Figure 2.  The intervention price in political-economic equilibrium, as a function of the fixed 
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11 The export subsidy/import tariff and the intervention price are interdependent policy 
instruments. The size of each depends on the size of the other. Whenever government 
imposes and intervention price above the world price, it must simultaneously impose an 
import tariff to keep from having to support the whole world’s production at its 
taxpayers’ expense.  (We assume that this tariff is always set high enough to prevent any 
imports when domestic quantity supplied exceeds domestic quantity demanded.)  
Similarly, when the intervention price is set high enough to lead to EU excess supply of 
wheat, the EU uses an export subsidy to keep the domestic price from falling below the 
intervention price.  We treat PI is an independent policy instrument, and the export   32 
                                                 
subsidy/import tariff as the dependent instrument, though we could have just as easily 
reversed this independent/dependent assignment without affecting our model’s results.  
This issue of policy instrument independence becomes important when we discuss 
income redistribution possibilities later in the article. 
2 We ignore any within-year discount factor.   
3 Henceforth, our notation and treatment of the value of information basically follows 
Laffont (1990). 













n −1 proper and improper 
subsets (Wolfram Math World, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Subset.html, accessed 
January 2009). 
5 The number of subsets of a set with four elements and the fourth Bell number happen to 
be 15.   This type of equality does not hold in general for a set with n elements.   For 
example, when n = 5, there are 31 proper and improper subsets excluding the empty set, 
but the fifth Bell number is 52. 
6 Since the chooser is assumed to know already from the beginning the set of states of 






UH}}, which tells only that the true state of nature is in the set of states of 






UH}}.  If the chooser faces P
1, it will be informed of the true state of 
nature before taking action, no matter what that state turns out to be. * 




UH { }, ω
DL,ω
DH,ω
UL { } { }, the chooser knows that it will 





5 { }.  it knows that if it receives 
￿ 
y1
5, then the 




5 ( ) = {ω
UH}, and that if it receives 
￿ 
y2
5 then the 




5 ( ) = {ω
DL, ω
DH, ω
UL}.  Given that it 
knows that he’s facing partition P





DL) +  π(ω
DH) + π(ω
UL).  Given that it receives 
￿ 
y2
5, as in (13) it 
will believe that the true state is ω










8 That is, letting P
m have some number T
m sets as members: P
m =  O1
m,...,OTm
m { }, and 
letting P
n have T
n sets as members: P
n =  O1
n,...,OTn
n { }, then if I
n is finer than I
m, we can 
take any element Oi
m in P
m, and it will be the union of one or more of the elements of P
n. 
9 This result here proved is a particular example of the general result of Laffont’s 
Theorem 1 (1989, p. 59). 
10 We use this overly-simplified model of political economy simply for the purposes of 
the simulation, and not to assert that government policy can be accurately analyzed with 
such methods. 